A distributed adaptive steplength stochastic approximation method for monotone stochastic Nash Games

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties of the problem and naive choices generally do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems. While a centralized adaptive stepsize SA scheme is proposed in [1] for the optimization framework, such a scheme provides no freedom for the agents in choosing their own stepsizes. Thus, a direct application of centralized stepsize schemes is impractical in solving Nash games. Furthermore, extensions to game-theoretic regimes where players may independently choose steplength sequences are limited to recent work by Koshal et al. [2]. Motivated by these shortcomings, we present a distributed algorithm in which each player updates his steplength based on the previous steplength and some problem parameters. The steplength rules are derived from minimizing an upper bound of the errors associated with players' decisions. It is shown that these rules generate sequences that converge almost surely to an equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game. Importantly, variants of this rule are suggested where players independently select steplength sequences while abiding by an overall coordination requirement. Preliminary numerical results are seen to be promising.Comment: 8 pages, Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Washington, 201

Improved guarantees for optimal Nash equilibrium seeking and bilevel variational inequalities

We consider a class of hierarchical variational inequality (VI) problems that subsumes VI-constrained optimization and several other important problem classes including the optimal solution selection problem, the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem, and the generalized NE seeking problem. Our main contributions are threefold. (i) We consider bilevel VIs with merely monotone and Lipschitz continuous mappings and devise a single-timescale iteratively regularized extragradient method (IR-EG). We improve the existing iteration complexity results for addressing both bilevel VI and VI-constrained convex optimization problems. (ii) Under the strong monotonicity of the outer level mapping, we develop a variant of IR-EG, called R-EG, and derive significantly faster guarantees than those in (i). These results appear to be new for both bilevel VIs and VI-constrained optimization. (iii) To our knowledge, complexity guarantees for computing the optimal NE in nonconvex settings do not exist. Motivated by this lacuna, we consider VI-constrained nonconvex optimization problems and devise an inexactly-projected gradient method, called IPR-EG, where the projection onto the unknown set of equilibria is performed using R-EG with prescribed adaptive termination criterion and regularization parameters. We obtain new complexity guarantees in terms of a residual map and an infeasibility metric for computing a stationary point. We validate the theoretical findings using preliminary numerical experiments for computing the best and the worst Nash equilibria